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In an ideal inclusive political system, all citizens are equally able to influence and challenge 
policies. We focus on how inclusiveness affects climate policies and outcomes. We argue that 
more inclusive systems should produce more policies in response to environmental threats 
and should have better outcomes. We test these hypotheses using panel and cross-sectional 
data relating to climate policy outputs and outcomes. The results suggest that inclusiveness is 
positively associated with policy outputs, but probably not with lower emissions of 
greenhouse gases. This pattern may relate to a lack of deliberation in systems, which are 
relatively inclusive in the narrower sense of pluralist theory.  
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Introduction 
It is widely believed that the empowerment of environmentally concerned citizens is a 
necessary condition for achieving sustainability, and that further democratization is therefore 
a key to achieving better environmental policies and outcomes. Concern for democratic 
inclusiveness is built into important international statements on sustainability, such as 
Principle 10 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, which states that 
environmental issues are “best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens, at the 
relevant level.”1 Here, we focus on whether an inclusive form of democracy, in which all 
citizens can participate in environmental decision-making, is important for environmental 
sustainability.  
Robert Dahl distinguished between two main dimensions of democracy – inclusiveness 
and contestation:2 inclusiveness varies with “the proportion of the population entitled to 
participate on a more or less equal plane in controlling and contesting the conduct of the 
government;”3 contestation requires that citizens “have unimpaired opportunities (1) to 
formulate their preferences, (2) to signify their preferences to their fellow citizens and the 
government by individual and collective action, [and] (3) to have their preferences weighed 
equally in the conduct of the government.”4 Contestation and inclusiveness are positively 
correlated, but there is considerable variation on the inclusiveness dimension among countries 
with similar contestation scores.5 We test the proposition that higher levels of democratic 
inclusiveness are associated with greater environmental policy outputs and better performance 
as measured by environmental outcomes. We focus on climate change because of its 
significance as an issue in environmental politics.  
In the academic literature, the belief that democracies have a better environmental 
performance than autocracies often rests on ideas about inclusiveness. Liberal democracies 
allow environmentally aware citizens to channel their demands more effectively than in non-
democratic systems, because of higher levels of inclusiveness.6 Unlike autocrats who can 
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survive in power by paying off supporters from a relatively small “selectorate,” democratic 
leaders must be more inclusive in the provision of benefits, which results in supplying public 
goods that benefit the electoral majority.7 This argument should also apply to environmental 
public goods.8 Some scholars argue that environmental sustainability necessarily presupposes 
democracy, because it demands widespread societal debate and engagement.9 In building our 
theoretical argument about inclusiveness, we draw on the work of green democratic theorists 
who believe that new, deeper forms of democratic participation play a role in eliciting 
environmental awareness and, thus, increasing relevant policy output as well as improving 
environmental outcomes.10  
Using a single-dimensional, aggregate measure of liberal democracy such as the polity2 
scale,11 there is an extensive statistical literature on whether democracies have better 
environmental performance, ceteris paribus, than autocracies.12 Democracies seem to be 
willing to take on more international environmental commitments,13 but in relation to other 
aspects of performance, conclusions depend on the sample of countries, the time period 
examined, and the aspect of environmental performance considered.14 So far, this literature is 
largely silent on the question of what dimension or dimensions of democracy matter most. 
Some theorists have long advocated participatory, community-based alternatives to liberal 
democracy,15 and some empirical studies in the environmental literature focus on themes 
related to inclusiveness such as civil society or stakeholder participation.16 However, there is 
a need to look more broadly at inclusiveness as a wider societal phenomenon advocated by 
normative theories of democracy.  
It is not our position that other aspects of democracy are irrelevant to sustainability. Rather, 
we focus on inclusiveness because a reasonable prima-facie case can be made for its 
importance, and because democratic theorists highlight it as a key aspect. However, we 
currently know little about its actual effects. First, we sketch the re-emergence of 
inclusiveness as a prominent theme in democratic theory. We establish the theoretical link 
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between inclusiveness and environmental outputs and outcomes. We then discuss aspects of 
inclusiveness, corresponding to inclusiveness in the pluralist sense that we think are 
significant and can be captured in a cross-national study. We find that inclusiveness in the 
pluralist sense leads to greater output of policy related to climate change, but this does not 
seem to translate into better policy outcomes at present.  
In the conclusion, we suggest that one possible explanation of this is the failure to meet 
deliberative norms in systems that are inclusive in the narrower pluralist sense. We thus 
perceive this research as an important step forward in the research agenda on inclusiveness, 
deliberation, pluralism, and environmental policies and outcomes.  
 
The re-emergence of inclusiveness 
Post-World War II democratic theory emphasized Weber’s and Schumpeter’s elitist models of 
democracy, in which participation was – if anything – seen as heightening conflict, disruption, 
and fanaticism.17 However, more recent democratic theory has revived the norms of 
inclusiveness and participation as part of the study of democracy as a normative ideal of 
government oriented to the common good, where “the normative legitimacy of a democratic 
decision depends on the degree to which those affected by it have been included in the 
decision-making processes and have had the opportunity to influence the outcomes.”18 This 
concern for inclusiveness as part of the core of democracy is evident in the institutionally 
focused, empirically based theories of pluralism.19 It has also been a key tenet of the 
resurgence of normative theory through the emergence of participatory 20 and deliberative 
democratic theory.21 
Dahl’s pluralist theory of democracy22 emerged as a direct critique of the Schumpeterian23 
model of democracy as competent leadership. According to Dahl, it is only through the free 
competition of a diverse multitude of views and beliefs that a “democratic equilibrium” could 
arise and result in positive political outcomes for the society. For this, it is insufficient to have 
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the right leaders in place; instead, citizens and social groups must be able to exert a “relatively 
high degree of control over leaders.”24 Rather than establishing sovereignty of a “majority,” 
democracy, for Dahl,25 requires the existence of multiple “minorities” in the form of social 
groups. Thus, Dahl and other pluralists counteract earlier elitist theories of democracy with a 
deep concern for, and recognition of, social inclusiveness in and participatory influence on the 
political process. 
Yet, more recent democratic theory has moved beyond these concerns, and Dahl himself 
was criticised for being elitist and neglecting earlier participatory and emancipatory ideals 
found in the more strongly normative strands of democratic theory.26 While pluralist theories 
largely focus on interest groups as key actors, participatory theories emphasize the 
significance of participation, even by individuals, in the wider political process, highlighting 
inclusive participation as the core of the emancipatory momentum inherent in ideals of 
democracy.27 For Pateman,28 “participatory democracy is built round the central assertion that 
individuals and their institutions cannot be considered in isolation from each other. The 
existence of representative institutions at national level is not sufficient for democracy.” 
Similarly, deliberative democracy is first and foremost a normative theory of democratic 
legitimacy,29 defining democratic legitimacy not by a specific set of representative institutions 
or electoral processes, but by all affected citizens’ “participation in authentic deliberation” 
about the political decisions they are subject to.30 As such, it goes beyond the earlier 
participatory theories by not only stipulating participation as such, but a demanding normative 
ideal of even deeper inclusiveness. 
As pointed out above, the literature already highlights a range of reasons to link 
inclusiveness with sustainability. However, on the basis of these developments in democratic 
theory, we offer some further considerations.  
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Democratic inclusiveness and environmental sustainability 
Most green theorists reject the existing liberal democratic model for its close connection with 
capitalism, its short-term orientation, and its distance from community engagement. While 
democratic theory has recently produced some new, largely small-scale alternatives,31 we 
argue that a key variable to overcoming these limitations, and hence a key variable capturing 
the environmental significance of democratic participation, is inclusiveness. First, only on a 
larger scale will a sufficiently wide range of citizens, organizations, and institutions be 
encouraged to take a more pro-social, longer-term perspective through participation.32 
Moreover, only in conceptions of broad, system-wide inclusiveness as opposed to singular 
participatory innovations is there room for a range of ways of giving voice, because of the 
diversity of institutions or institutions allowing protest and other antagonistic voices.33 Thus, 
we argue, the widely theorized promise of democratic participation for sustainability is most 
likely to be realized when democratic engagement is inclusive in a system-wide sense – which 
could therefore plausibly be one of the core features at work in the link between 
democratization and environmental policy-making. 
The strongest case for excluding some citizens from environmental decision-making might 
be that their perceived interests would lead them to wish to block necessary changes. Yet, if 
people are excluded from the political process, they are less likely to see it as legitimate and 
to accept its output or outcomes. What is more, social capital is known to be particularly 
important to solving environmental problems, because it encourages reciprocity and pro-
social behaviour.34 Citizens who are excluded may come to distrust those who make 
decisions; and exclusion also prevents network relations between all members of the 
community from being built. Thus, exclusion is liable to reduce the amount of social capital, 
as it isolates some citizens. This would make it harder to motivate community- or society-
wide change. 
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Dealing with climate change in particular requires considerable changes in everyday 
behaviour that are hard for any state to monitor and to control (coercively) – if this should 
even be seen as desirable. Hence, the legitimacy that stems from inclusiveness is particularly 
important for dealing with this issue. Although less progress might be possible in the short 
term if an inclusive process brings in those opposed to change, in the long run, this seems 
necessary as processes regarded as illegitimate are likely only to bring about limited change. 
For instance, while it is by no means the case that all sections of the business community 
oppose moderate forms of ecological modernisation,35 some industries decisively oppose 
fundamental and necessary changes such as the rapid move to a low or no-carbon energy 
economy. This is true of some powerful oil, gas, and coal companies, for example. Wide 
participation counteracts the domination of powerful economic interests typical of liberal 
democracies by opening up room for a wider set of values and concerns, including other-
regarding, generalizable interests and values to come to the fore.36 Companies and sectors 
whose immediate interests lead them to wish to block change may be induced by concern for 
profitability to accept it if they see that most citizens are now persuaded, and participation 
might also induce changes in corporate norms and business ethics. 
Similarly, some have made the case for environmental guardianship where citizens are 
excluded from key decisions made by scientific and technical elites who know what is best for 
the rest of society.37 However, while scientific and technological expertise is important for 
dealing with environmental issues, they are far from being the only relevant forms of 
knowledge. Skills required to adapt everyday behaviour, to work together in local 
communities, to find ways of financing small investments, and to persuade others of the 
seriousness of the problem, are widely distributed in society. It is by no means the case that 
political or economic elites monopolize them. Citizen engagement and participation focus the 
political debate, bring together information, and provide opportunities for social learning, all 
of which can make environmental politics more effective and long-term in orientation.38 
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Yet, what is often neglected is that only if these political processes are inclusive, so that 
citizens and stakeholders feel they can have a meaningful say, will it become worthwhile for 
them to develop relevant skills.39 There is potential for a virtuous circle whereby 
inclusiveness generates better-quality debate while at the same time tying citizens together as 
members of a political community. This can be crucial in relation to typical problems of 
implementation between environmental policy outputs and outcomes. Policies may fail to 
have an impact because they are not implemented, perhaps because they were purely 
symbolic and meant to reassure the public.40 If policy is arrived at after an inclusive debate 
that engages not only the wider public, but also organs of the state that have to develop 
detailed policies and to implement them, it is less likely that the state can just ignore what has 
gone on,41 because the debate will create a public attentive to implementation failure of an 
extent not reached at a smaller scale or less deep forms of engagement. 
Thus, we argue that it is not just democratic politics as such, but democratic inclusiveness 
that is centrally important to sustainability. Inasmuch as successful sustainability politics 
demands, as we have highlighted, deep, proactive citizen debate that includes critical voices 
and fosters social learning, the relevant form of inclusiveness goes beyond the sheer 
numerical weight of participation. Whilst pluralism is far from being a homogenous view of 
politics,42 it tends to ignore the processes that lead citizens to hold the views they do, and to 
ask questions about how such processes should be seen from a normative perspective.43 In 
this respect, we can contrast a “pluralist” focus on the numerical weight of participation with 
our idea that it is deeper, system-wide inclusive debate that holds the greatest promise for 
sustainability. We return to this point, in combination with deliberation, in the conclusion.  
 
Comparing inclusiveness across countries 
An important question about inclusiveness is who does and does not belong to the demos. 
Arguably, all competent adults affected by decisions should be included.44 Beyond this, 
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however, our theory contributes the idea that a deep democratic form of inclusiveness is 
important. For the purpose of our study and in light of its role in recent democratic theory, we 
thus seek to capture the following aspects of inclusiveness. First, inclusiveness increases to 
the extent to which citizens have equal opportunity to express their views, if they so desire. 
Standard individual citizenship rights to freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, association, 
and protection of the person from undue use of state power must exist. Unless this is the case, 
individuals may be deterred from expressing their viewpoint. Hence, we should consider 
cross-nationally comparable measures of political freedoms. 
Second, our understanding of expression of viewpoint goes beyond the mere uttering of 
opinions. This may be possible, yet the views expressed may get no entry into processes 
where decisions are made, because such views are excluded in some way. If effective 
expression of views is to be possible, the political system must be open and competitive, not 
monopolized. A system is monopolized to the extent that certain individuals, groups or parties 
are able to exclude viewpoints from forums in which they are involved. For example, such 
exclusion could occur because some group, in combination with state agencies and 
politicians, excludes viewpoints, as highlighted in the literatures on agency capture.45 We see 
competition as necessary for inclusiveness and, hence, we should consider cross-nationally 
comparable competition measures. 
Third, individuals may be deterred from expressing opinions, because the probability that 
they will make a difference is rather small and there are costs for doing so.46 If citizens do not 
express views because in effect they see this is pointless, we argue that they are excluded. 
Ideally, a flourishing civil society includes mechanisms that make individual expression seem 
meaningful, as well as providing selective incentives to participate that offset costs.47 Hence, 
we should capture how the strength of civil society varies cross-nationally. 
We expect these three aspects of inclusiveness we have highlighted to be positively 
associated with policy outputs and with improved environmental outcomes.  
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Research design 
Climate policy output – Dataset and variables 
It may take a considerable time for policy outputs to translate into changes in outcomes, so we 
focus on both aspects. Climate policy output is a cross-sectional measure comparing 149 
countries’ average values over 1990-2010. It is an additive index capturing ratification 
behaviour (whether and how fast countries have committed to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol), financial contributions (how often has a state made its financial contributions to the 
UNFCCC secretariat between 1995 and 2010), and reporting behaviour (whether a state 
submitted national climate reports to the UNFCCC and whether it has done so on time).48 We 
recoded this variable to range from 0 to 1, with higher values standing for more cooperative 
climate policy outputs. Ignoring temporal variance is justified, because climate policy output 
is constructed so as to capture international commitment over the life of the climate change 
regime.  
Our first measure relating to inclusiveness is PARCOMP, which captures on a five-point 
scale “the degree to which political participation is free from government control.”49 In 
countries obtaining the highest score of 5, “[t]here are relatively stable and enduring, secular 
political groups which regularly compete for political influence at the national level; ruling 
groups and coalitions regularly, voluntarily transfer central power to competing groups. 
Competition among groups seldom involves coercion or disruption.”50 This measure, which 
we term inclusiveness—P, captures the importance of a competitive political process to 
inclusiveness.  
Our second measure pertaining to inclusiveness comes from Coppedge et al.51 who start 
with more than a dozen indicators of democracy and, in total, up to 19 sub-dimensions of 
democracy, and then carry out a principal components analysis. The first component relates to 
inclusiveness because it captures political freedoms, the sub-dimensions of democracy that 
load most heavily on it being adult suffrage, the size of the “selectorate” that is important to 
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maintaining regime stability,52 elections, legislative and executive selection, women’s 
political rights, Vanhanen’s index of participation, and openness of executive recruitment.53 
We term this variable inclusiveness—C. It correlates highly and positively with 
inclusiveness—P (Pearson’s r=0.626; p<0.01). 
We use the average number of established ENGOs with an organizational structure 
registered in a country with the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) 
between 1990 and 2006 to capture a flourishing civil society. The data for this variable, 
ENGO leverage, are taken from Bernauer et al.54 We expect the direct effect of this variable 
to be positive, as environmentally concerned citizens are more likely to participate.55 We also 
expect a positive, synergistic interaction between ENGO leverage and either of the two 
inclusiveness variables as higher scores on these should allow organised environmental 
groups to express themselves in debate.56 We capture this using multiplicative interaction 
terms. 
We additionally consider variables that have been identified by the previous literature as 
crucial determinants of environmental outputs.57 We control for the number of 
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) a state is a member of,58 because states more strongly 
involved in the IGO network are also more likely to cooperate on issues such as climate 
change.59 Data are not available for years after 2005, so we use the average annual count 
between 1990 and 2005. Second, we control for trade openness (ln) – the logged ratio of the 
sum of exports and imports to GDP,60 and foreign direct investment (FDI) net inflows as a 
percentage of GDP. These could relate to pressure for environmental de-regulation, but might 
also capture openness to cleaner technology; so correlations with the dependent variables 
could run in either direction.61 Environmental degradation may be the result of high rates 
GDP growth.62 Moreover, higher population density may cause stress.63 The literature 
frequently argues that the environment is a relatively low priority for states in the early stages 
of development, but it becomes a higher priority with further development;64 hence, we 
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include the logged GDP per capita (GDP per capita (ln)) and its square term (square of GDP 
per capita (ln)) measured in constant 2005 US Dollars. Countries that are large producers of 
fossil fuels might be less likely to pursue policies, which improve climate policy outputs, as 
mitigation costs are higher;65 so we control for a country’s oil, gas, and coal production per 
capita. Finally, we employ the climate change index (CCI) as a measure of climate change 
risk exposure.66 
 
Climate policy outcome – Dataset and variables 
Our outcome measure is CO2 emission levels in metric tons per capita (log-transformed). The 
data for this variable vary over time and, thus, we use a time-series cross-sectional dataset. 
After taking into account missing values of the explanatory variables, the panel data comprise 
201 countries over the time period 1974 to 2000. 67Given the longitudinal nature of these data, 
we include a temporally lagged dependent variable that captures a country’s CO2 emission 
level in the previous year, country fixed effects, and year fixed effects. The lagged dependent 
variable captures general time dependencies, while year fixed effects control for common 
temporal shocks. Finally, country fixed effects control for idiosyncratic path dependencies 
and other forms of cross-sectional heterogeneity.  
The controls we include are annual observations of the same ones we include in models of 
climate output, but we exclude the CCI and oil, gas, and coal production as these are time-
invariant and, hence, incompatible with country fixed effects. We lag all controls by one year 
to address endogeneity concerns. 
 
Results 
Table 1 summarizes our empirical results for climate policy output based on OLS regression. 
We report four models. The first model considers inclusiveness—P, ENGO leverage, and the 
control variables. Model 2 is similar to the first one, but we replace inclusiveness—P by 
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inclusiveness—C. Model 3 and Model 4 are similar to Models 1 and 2, respectively, with the 
addition of the multiplicative term between the ENGO item and the inclusiveness measure. 
The table’s entries are non-standardized coefficients and we present robust standard errors in 
parentheses. 
__________ 
Table 1 
__________ 
In Models 1-4, the coefficients on either inclusiveness—P or inclusiveness—C 
(respectively) are statistically significant at least at the 5 percent level with positive 
coefficients, so we find support for our theoretical argument that inclusiveness increases 
policy output. 68 In Model 1 a one-unit increase of inclusiveness—P is associated with a 
0.039-point increase in climate policy output, while in Model 2 a 0.047 increase is associated 
with a one-unit increase of inclusiveness—C. Given that climate policy output ranges between 
0 and 1, the impact of either inclusiveness variable is very substantial. 69  
__________ 
Figure 1 
__________ 
In Models 1 and 2 the assumption is that the effect of ENGO-leverage is not conditioned 
by inclusiveness. Here we see no significant effect from ENGO-leverage on policy output. In 
Models 3-4, where we assume an interactive effect, we find that the interaction terms are 
significant at the 10 percent level, but we note that their coefficients are negative; so 
inclusiveness actually decreases the impact of ENGO-leverage on output. The multiplicative 
specification is easier to appreciate in the graphical form depicted in Figure 1, showing how 
the coefficient of ENGO leverage changes with the relevant inclusiveness variable. According 
to Model 3 and the top left-hand panel of Figure 1, the significant and positive impact of 
ENGO leverage on environmental output declines as inclusiveness—P increases, becoming 
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insignificant if inclusiveness—P is greater than about 3.5. The same qualitative pattern 
emerges in relation to inclusiveness—C in Model 4, as seen in the top right-hand panel of 
Figure 1. These results suggest that civil-society organization increases policy output unless 
inclusiveness is relatively high; but they are inconsistent with the idea of positive synergy 
with the inclusiveness.  
__________ 
Table 2 
__________ 
 Table 2 presents our results for the climate policy outcome measure, CO2 emissions per 
capita (ln), specifications being similar to those in Table 1. First, neither inclusiveness 
measure is significant in Models 5-8 and, hence, inclusiveness is unlikely to affect climate 
policy outcomes. 70 In Models 5 and 6 the assumption is that the impact of ENGO-leverage is 
not conditioned by inclusiveness. Here ENGO-leverage has a negative and significant impact 
on CO2 emissions per capita (ln). A one-unit increase (i.e., one additional ENGO) is 
associated with 0.1 percent reduction in CO2 emissions per capita. In Models 7 and 8 we 
assume, in contrast, that there is an interactive effect. The bottom panels in Figure 1, 
refereeing to Model 7 and 8 respectively, suggest that the negative impact of ENGO-leverage 
may only be significant for moderate to high levels of inclusiveness.  
While none of the controls in Table 1 reaches conventional levels of statistical 
significance; most of them do so in Table 2. For instance, we find a (largely) significant U-
shaped relationship between GDP per capita (ln) and CO2 emissions per capita (ln): after a 
turning point has been reached, countries emit less carbon as they become richer, other things 
equal. Membership of more IGOs is significantly associated with lower CO2 emissions per 
capita. Substantively, a one-unit increase (i.e., one additional IGO membership) is associated 
with 0.2 percent reduction in CO2 emissions per capita. Another strong predictor of the 
climate policy outcome measure is GDP growth. For example, a one-unit increase of this 
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variable in Model 5 leads to an increase of exp(0.001)=1.001, i.e., a 0.1 percent increase in 
CO2 emissions per capita. Consistently, larger values of trade intensity or openness are 
associated with higher levels of carbon emissions. The results for GDP growth and trade 
openness (ln) are robust across model specifications, and they are also in line with our 
expectations, as economic growth and a higher engagement in the global trade market are 
usually thought of as being associated with worse environmental outcomes. 
Our statistical models address associations between variables, not causation. Moreover, the 
models in Table 1 rely on purely cross-section data, which does not allow for exploiting 
temporal variance. Nevertheless, we can reach some summary conclusions. It appears that 
inclusiveness, as measured by our indicators of liberal freedoms and a competitive political 
process, is associated with increased policy outputs, but does not significantly improve 
outcome performance. It could be argued that between the broad international commitments 
that enter our measure of policy output and reduced emissions of greenhouse gasses must 
come detailed legislation at the domestic level, for instance to encourage change in patterns of 
energy demand and supply. Initial exploration suggests that inclusiveness may positively 
influence domestic policy output, too. In the online appendix, we show that the output of 
renewable energy policy at this level is positively correlated with ENGO leverage and, in this 
case, there is a synergistic interaction between ENGO leverage and inclusiveness. As 
discussed above, our indicators capture systemic inclusiveness only from a pluralist 
perspective. We return to this point in the conclusion, as it may help explain why we get 
different results for output and outcomes.  
ENGO leverage appears to increase policy output unless inclusiveness is high. In this case 
rather than a positive synergy between civil-society organization and our measures of 
inclusiveness, we actually observe a negative interaction, however. This apparently 
paradoxical patterns confirm what has been termed the democracy-civil society paradox:71 the 
marginal impact of an organized environmental movement decreases with higher levels of 
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democracy (in our case inclusiveness) as, for one thing, democratic systems tend to pursue 
better environmental policies anyway. We also find that ENGO-leverage may decrease 
emissions, but only at moderate to high levels of inclusiveness. Thus, the evidence for the 
impact of this aspect of inclusiveness is quite limited. 
 
Conclusion 
Our purpose in this paper has been two-fold. First, we developed the argument that 
inclusiveness plays a key role in the widely theorized importance of democracy for 
environmental sustainability. We contended that new forms of participatory democracy are 
indeed promising for better environmental policy, but that it is important that these processes 
are inclusive in a broader sense, so that citizens feel they can have their critical views taken 
into account when climate change policy is made, and are driven to adopt more pro-social 
outlooks. Second, we tested whether inclusiveness impacts on climate change policy outputs 
and outcomes. Understood in a pluralist sense, inclusiveness is associated with more policy 
output, but it does not necessarily appear to be associated with lower emissions.  
One explanation of our findings is that the impact of inclusiveness of policy output has not 
yet had time to show up in reductions in emissions. Although we cannot ignore this 
possibility, we do not find it fully convincing. It certainly takes time to implement policies, 
but there was considerable domestic action to initiate policies in some developed democracies 
even before the Kyoto Protocol was signed in 1997, going back to policy debates in the late 
1980s and the signing of the Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1992.72 
Recall, however, that our inclusiveness measures are based on, and in the more limited 
sense associated with, pluralist theory. Currently, it is not possible in a cross-national 
comparative study to capture whether an inclusive system also has processes that respect key 
features of deliberation, as conceived in normative theory. We recognize that this is a 
limitation of our study, but there are still good reasons to assess the impact of inclusiveness: 
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as we saw, several arguments in the literature link it to sustainability; and if it is also true that 
the promise of deliberation is limited without inclusiveness, inclusiveness stands as a key 
focus.  
Still, it follows that we simply could not capture deliberative inclusiveness at this point. 
Deliberation is a particularly demanding process of public reasoning, in which the fair and 
equal setting induces citizens to look beyond their immediate self-interest to justify their 
preferences in terms that all can in principle accept. While self-interest may enjoin citizens to 
free-ride on the environmental commons,73 after deliberation, they should be more orientated 
towards the public good of sustainability. Recent developments within democratic theory 
have motivated a large body of literature on the role played specifically by deliberative 
engagement in environmental governance,74 and empirical studies of innovations such as 
deliberative polls and citizens’ juries have provided some evidence for a positive effect of 
deliberation on environmentally relevant attitudes.75 While much of this literature has focused 
on experimentation with small-scale artificial events known as “mini-publics,”76 more 
recently, the focus in the theory has shifted towards the concept of “deliberative systems,”77 
stressing larger-scale interactions between multiple deliberative as well as non-deliberative 
social actors, sites, and processes. Systemic deliberation can be thought of as dynamic sets of 
interacting processes, institutions, actors, and venues at various scales that may not be fully 
deliberative in themselves, but nonetheless contribute to inclusive deliberative engagement at 
the level of the society as a whole.78 For instance, a deliberative system might include meso-
level deliberative forums linking organised groups and the state,79 but it could also 
incorporate oppositional movements and forums. Thus, the recent shift in interest towards 
systemic deliberation is in line with the centrality of inclusiveness, of a type going beyond 
mere formal pluralism, that we have stressed in this paper. That being said, given its abstract 
normative nature, its full demandingness cannot at this point be captured in a quantitative 
empirical study. 
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And yet, it is instructive to keep this normative-theoretical context in mind, as the degree 
of “deliberativeness” of a society’s democratic inclusiveness could play a part in explaining 
the discrepancy between policy outputs and outcomes we have observed through our analysis. 
If inclusiveness is high in the pluralist sense, but there is little critical, attitude-changing 
deliberation among citizens, it is possible that climate change policy output will not translate 
into a significant reduction of emissions. It is deliberative engagement in particular that 
should create a public attentive to, and critical of, policies that are largely of symbolic 
significance, having little or no impact – even if implemented. Many developed countries 
were able to meet their commitments under the Kyoto Protocol as a result of de-
industrialization and changes in the fuel mix brought about purely because of market forces, 
rather than climate change policy leading to changed social practices. In any case, the direct 
impact of Kyoto on global average temperature is probably miniscule, although some see the 
agreement as opening up economic, technological, and political possibilities for more 
thoroughgoing action. It is quite unlikely that commitments entered into force under the 
Copenhagen Climate Accord of 2009 will prevent dangerous global average temperature 
increase.80 Participation by ENGOs in negotiating the Kyoto Protocol had some influence on 
process and framing, but little influence on outcomes.81 It hardly met deliberative norms, 82 
and was hardly accompanied by a ferment of deliberation at domestic level. If, so far, there is 
a considerable element of political symbolism rather than substance in policy outputs on 
climate change, it may be because inclusiveness on its own is insufficient, whether at the 
international or domestic level, without deliberation. Until cross-nationally comparable 
measures of the degree to which politics is deliberative as well as inclusive are developed, it is 
not possible to tell whether this explanation is supported by evidence. However, by 
developing the theory of inclusiveness to include deliberation, we have opened up a potential 
explanation, which we feel is well-worth pursuing in future research. 
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We conclude by stressing our contribution to the discourse on environmental policies and 
inclusiveness. We hope that this research constitutes a first step towards a research agenda on 
inclusiveness, deliberation, pluralism, and environmental policies and outcomes. 
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